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Categoricity of Partial Logics 
FRED JOHNSON* 
Timothy Smiley [3] invites us to reconsider the way we think of a logi-
cal calculus. He says: "In practice, logical calculi are identified with their 
consequence relations; thus the test for the adequacy of an axiomatization 
is whether it succeeds in equating deducibility (f-) with consequence (F= )." 
(p. 6) He contends that the practice is justified "only if specifying the conse-
quence relation is sufficient to determine the entire sentential output of the 
semantics". (p. 7) Smiley shows that the standard consequence relation for the 
propositional logic (as discussed in virtually every elementary course in logic) 
does not determine the sentential output of the semantics. To do so, it would 
have to determine all of the logical relationships among the sentences of the 
calculus. It would tell us "which sentences are the logical truths, which pairs 
are equivalents, contraries, subcontraries or contradictories ... " (p. 7) But, as 
Smiley shows, the standard consequence relation for the propositional calcu-
lus does not tell us that the sentences p and -p are contraries, for example. 
That is, the consequence relation for the single-conclusion propositional cal-
culus is not categorical. 
So, there is a "categoricity problem" for a logical calculus that is solved 
by providing a consequence relation that specifies the semantic output of the 
calculus. Smiley [3] solves the categoricity problem for total-valuation 
logics-logics in which the semantic output consists of values that are desig-
nated or undesignated. Ian Rumfitt [2] extends Smiley's work by solving the 
categoricity problem for multiple-conclusion, partial-valuation logics-logics 
that permit truth-value gaps. One purpose of the present paper is to extend 
Smiley's work by solving the categoricity problem for single-conclusion, 
partial-valuation logics. Categorical deducibility will also be discussed and 
illustrated. 
My general goal is to encourage the development of "judgement logics", 
which have not received the attention they deserve. 
• I am grateful to Peter Woodruff for extensive discussions during and after the LOGICA '98 
conference. I also thank Vladimir Sazonov and Gennady Osipov, who enabled me to read a 
version of this paper to the Russian Academy of Sciences Program Systems Institute. And I am 
grateful to Gregory Wheeler for his helpful comments on a rough draft of this paper. 
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1. An Illustration of the Categoricity Problem 
Consider a language with only two sentences: A and B. A semantics for the 
A B 
language is determined by the array c1 t provided there is also an 
c2 f 
understanding about which, if any, of the values t andf are designated. Smiley 
[3] says "The semantics of a calculus produces a classification of every as-
signment of truth-values (across all the sentences of the calculus simultane-
ously) as being either "possible" or "impossible'"'. Call this classification the 
'sentential output of the calculus' (p. 225). So, given the semantics indicated 
by the above array, the classifications (Aft, Bit) and (A/f, Bit) are possible 
(p-classifications); but the classifications (Aft, Blf> and (A/f, Blf> are impossi-
ble (i-classifications). 
Given the standard definition of semantic consequence fot. .. ~z~on­
clusion calculi, X F= y iff for every p-classification of sentenc£-s rr;·xgets an 
undesignated value or the sentence y gets a designated value. As~me that tis 
the designated valuep(. So, for the above semantics, call it St. F=s, = { (0, B), 
({A}, A), ({A}, B), ({B}, B), ({A, B}, A), ({A, B}, B)}. 
Let us form semantics S2 by deleting classification c1 from the above ar-
ray. Assuming that tis the designated value, it follows that . Note, 
for example, that 0 F=s, B and 0 B; and {B} i#:s, A and {B} A. This 
means that neither F=s, nor is a categorical consequence relation. For, 
though the two consequence relations have the same extension, the semantics 
that produces them are very different. Given semantics S 11 A and B are not 
contraries, and A is contingent; given semantics S2, A and B are contraries, 
and A is necessarily false. So, there is a categoricity problem-that of defin-
ing consequence so that if the semantics for a language is distinct from an-
other semantics for the language then the corresponding consequence rela-
tions are distinct. The above example parallels an example Smiley [3] uses to 
call attention to the categoricity problem. Consider this array for proposi-





-A (A & B) 
t T (t) 
t f 
f f 
If the semantics is altered by deleting classification c the resulting seman-
tics is very different from the originaL A and -A become contraries. Still, the 
distinct arrays generate the same consequence relation, assuming that t is the 
designated value. 
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2. Smiley's Force Solution for Sc-tv Logics 
Smiley [3] solves the categoricity problem for single-conclusion (sc), total-
valuation (tv) logics by using two forces: strong assertion and strong rejec-
tion. We use this Frege-inference he cites to identify these forces: 'If he was 
not in Berlin, he did not commit the murder. He was not in Berlin. So he did 
not commit the murder.' Smiley, unlike Frege, thinks that the second premise 
and the conclusion may be thought of as denials (which, like assertions) are 
forces. They agree that the first premise is an assertion with no embedded 
forces. Using EV for strong assertion and + for strong denial, Smiley, in dis-
agreement with Frege, would agree that the above argument may be presented 
in this form: $(-,B ~ -,M). +B. So +M. 1 Frege, as interpreted by Smiley, 
insists that there is no distinction to be made between =!=B and $-,B. And, 
according to Smiley, Frege does not think that the notion of denial as a force 
should come into play when discussing logical consequence. 
Consider a language with sentences A, B, .... Let EVs and +s be judgements 
iff s is a sentence. A p-classification satisfies EVs iff it gives s a designated 
value and satisfies s iff it gives san undesignated value. If J is a set of judge-
ments and j is a judgement then J l=s j iff there is no p-classification that satis-
fies every member of J and does not satisfy j. 
The consequence relation l=s ('S' for 'Smiley') for "judgement logic" shares 
some of the features of the normal consequence relation for "sentence logic". 
We mention some facts and provide familiar names in parentheses of princi-
ples that are exemplified. Set brackets are omitted. EVA EVA (reflexivity); 
if :!:A EBB then =!=A, EVC l=s EBB (dilution); if :!:A l=s EBB and EBB l=s EVC then 
+A EVC (transitivity). And this is an instance of "reductio": If EVA l=s EBB and 
EVA :!: B, then 0 t=s :!:A. 
Theorem 1 (Smiley) F=s is categorical. 
Proof: Given a semantics, there are only two kinds of classifications we need 
to consider. Suppose c is a classification that assigns designated values to 
every sentence. Then c is a p-classification iff EV(X - { x}) l*s tx, where X is 
the universal set of sentences and x E X. Suppos~ c is a ~lassiJ.kajion th~~ , 
c...i-1o-r--~~ vt1-
assigns an undesignated value to sentence y. Then ~Xu :!:(Y {y}) IFs EVy, u 
where Xu Y is the universal set of sentences, each sentence in X is desig-
nated, and each sentence in Y is undesignated. 
1 Smiley uses an asterisk instead of our double dagger for strong rejection and uses no special 
symbol for strong assertion. Given our interest in distinguishing two kinds of rejection and two 
kinds of assertion, it is helpful to deviate from his use of symbols. 
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So, for example, consider the array mentioned above that we used to show 
that and are not categorical. (Aft, Bit) is a p-classification for "'-'1tl(:li!l:C--···------
tics S1 but not for semantics S2• Note that Et>A ~;<::. t B, but Et>A@ tB. For 
both S1 and S2 (Aif, Blf> is an i-classification. As indicated by the proof, 
t A i=<, Et1 B and t A GJB. Since i=:~. and i=:~, determine the semantic out-
put of S 1 and S2, respectively, the two consequence relations are categorical. 
3. Rumfitt's Force Solution for Mc-pv Logics 
To illustrate the notion of a partial-valuation logic we modify an example used 
in Section I above. Consider a language with only two sentences: A and B. 
A B 
Ct t 






t is the designated value. This is not a total-valuation logic since the p-clas-
sification c3 assigns neither a designated nor an undesignated value to B. That 
is, the semantics contains truth-value gaps. 
Rumfitt extends Smiley's (3] notion of semantic consequence to infer-
ences with sets of judgements as conclusions. So, given a semantics and sets J 
and K of judgements, J K ('R' for 'Rumfitt') iff there is no p-classification 
which satisfies every member of J and satisfies no member of K. 
Let us refer to the above semantics as S3, where t is the designated value. 
Then, for example, {ffJA, tB} 0, and 0 {tA, GJB}. 
But {EBA} tF.~. {GJB, tB}, and {tA} tt=~. {GJB, tB}. 
As another illustration of the notion of semantic consequence, notice 
that a semantics in which there are no p-classifications does not generate the 
same consequences as a semantics in which there is exactly one p-clas-
sification that assigns no value to either A or B. For the former, but not the 
latter, { ffJA, tA, GJB, tB} is a consequence of the empty set. 
Given any semantics for a language with sentences A and B, 
$A i=R { G?JA, tB} (an instance of overlap). 
And if EBA i=R GJB and $A tB, then 0 tA, provided that 
0 I=R {$A, tA} (an instance of "qualified" reductio). 
Theorem 2 (Rumfitt) is categorical. 
Proof: Let a classification c assign designated, undesignated, and no values to 
sentences in X, Y, and Z, respectively. Then c is a p-classification iff EBX, 
t Y ti=R GJZ, tZ. 
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So, for example, consider p-classification c3 for semantics S3 above. Note 
that :j:{A} f:F {EBB, :j:B }. 
4. A Force Solution for Sc-pv Logics 
Oddly, though Rumfitt [2] calls attention to materials that may be used to 
provide a direct and more interesting extension of Smiley's [3] solution of the 
categoricity problem for single-conclusion, total-valuation logics, he does not 
do so. Rumfitt informally distinguishes two kinds of assertion. By using two 
kinds of assertion and two kinds of denial we can solve the categoricity 
problem for single-conclusion, partial-valuation logics. 
Rumfitt [2] says that by answering 'No' to the question 'Is the present 
King of France bald?' you may be indicating that 'the relevant proposition is 
being rejected as false. And this kind of rejection ... differs from the rejection 
of a proposition as merely being not true. If you do not believe that there is a 
present King of France, you will not wish to answer 'No' to the question ... 
[but you will] certainly refuse to give the answer 'Yes' .. .' (p. 226). We have 
used :j: for the former (strong) notion of rejection. For the latter (weak) notion 
of rejection we shall use t. Corresponding to these two notions of rejection 
are strong assertion (E.e) and weak assertion ( + ): asserting as true, and assert-
ing as not false, respectively.2 
Given the above distinctions, we extend the notions of judgement and sin-
gle-conclusion consequence in the natural way. Let :F range over forces in 
{ $, +, :j:, t}. :F s is a judgement iff s is a sentence. A classification c satisfies 
+s iff it does not assign an undesignated value to s; and a classification c 
satisfies t s iff it does not assign a designated value to s. Let J be a set of 
judgements and let j be a judgement J t= j for a pv-semantics iff there is no 
p-classification that satisfies every member of J and does not satisfy j. 
Suppose we have a pv-semantics for a language with sentences A, B, and 
C. EE>A t= +A, and :j:A I= tA. If +A I= E.E>A, $A I= :f.B, and :j:B I= tC, then 
+A I= tC (transitivity). And if EE>A I= EE>B and EE>A I= tB, then 0 I= tA (re-
ductio). 
Theorem 3 I= is categorical. 
Proof: Given a semantics for a language, for any classification c let X, Y, and 
Z be the sets of sentences that are designated, undesignated, and neither des-
ignated nor undesignated, respectively. There are only three cases to consider. 
2 Rumfitt uses 'internal rejection' and 'external rejection' to refer to strong and weak rejection, 
respectively. Woodruff [4] suggests 'hedged' (and 'weak') may be used when referring to the 
two weak forces. 
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1) Suppose that e assigns a designated value to sentence x. Then e is a p-clas-
sification iff E£1(X {x}), :j:Y, +Z, tZ J::l: tx. 2) Suppose that e assigns an un-
designated value to sentence y. Then e is a p-classification iff $X, :j:(Y- {y} ), 
+Z, tZ J::l: +y. 3) Suppose that e assigns no value to sentence z. Then e is a 
p-classification iff Ei:1X, :j:Y, +Z, tZ J::l: E£1z. 
5. Categorical Deducibility for Bochvar Logic 
Smiley [3] captures the propositional calculus syntactically with his definition 
of deducibility for single conclusions. Rumfitt [2] captures Bochvar logic 
syntactically by using multiple conclusions. We will define deducibility for 
single conclusions to capture Bochvar logic in a simpler way. Moreover, our 
Jeffrey-style proofs of soundness and completeness are simpler than Rumfitt's 
Henkin-style proofs. 
Consider a language with sentences A, B, ... formed in the standard way by 
using unary connectives ...., and T and binary connective A. The p-clas-





So, for example, if A is assigned no value then -,A is assigned no value 
but TA is assigned f. 
We use I= 8 to refer to the semantic consequence relation determined by 
the p-classifications, where t is the designated value. 
We follow Jeffrey [ 1] and define deducibility by using trees. Let eel$= t, 
ed+ = :j:, ed:j: =+,and edt=$. Our tree rules are: 
1. From :F...., A infer ed:J A. 
2. From E£1TA (+TA) infer Ei:1A. 
3. From :j:TA (tTA) infer tA. 
. $A 
4. From $(A A B) mfer --. 
E£18 
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. Et>A +A +B 
5. From +(A "B) mfer - I - I -. 
Et>B tB tB 
. c Et>A I A 
6. From :f: (A " B) mter -
:f:B Et>B :f:B 
7. From t(A "B) infer tA I tB. 
8. From Et>A and (tA) infer x. 
9. From +A and infer x. 
By definition J t-8 where J is a finite set of judgements, iff a finished 
tree with the members of J u cd:J s as its initial list has no open paths. 
So, for example, { Et>A} t-8 +A, since the tree, with the single path-Et>A, 
:f:A, x-is closed. 
Theorem 4 (soundness and completeness) 1=8 = t-8 • 
Proof: Imitate Jeffrey's [l] proof. Show that the tree rules are sound and 
complete. Note, for example that if a p-classification satisfies $-,A it satisfies 
and vice versa. 
6. Woodruff's Judgement Logic 
After the LOGICA '98 conference, I became aware of Peter Woodruff's valu-
able work on judgement, partial-valuation logics. To my knowledge Wood-
ruff [4] gives the first judgement logic that uses these two forces: strong 
assertion and weak assertion. In Woodruff's judgement logic (using the above 
terminology for forces and non-Bochvar interpretations of connectives) 
+(A~ B) +B)} (p. 127) and ~ Tu) ~ Tu) +A (p. 132). 
Given our present concerns, it is natural to ask whether I= w ('W' for 
'Woodruff) is categorical. 
TheoremS is not categoricaL 
Proof: Consider a language with one sentence A. LetS' be a semantics with 
one p-classification (A If) and let S" be a semantics with the additional p-clas-
sification (A It). Note that = {({$A}, Et>A), }, ({+A}, Et>A), 
({+A}, +A), ({Et>A, +A}, Et>A), ({Et>A, +A}, =I=~:. 
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7. A Simpler Force Solution for Sc-pv Logics 
Consider the following dialogue. 
A: Is Goldbach's conjecture true? 
B: I cannot say. 
A: Is it false? 
B: I cannot say. 
A: Is it one or the other? 
B: Of course, though there are some anti-realist lunatics who disagree 
with me. 
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B's assertion cannot be expressed by using either ffi or+. We use u tore-
fer to the kind of assertion B makes.3 
Let :F range over { +, t, u} and Jet a p-classification satisfy Us iff it as-
signs either a designated value or an undesignated value to s. Define !=' in the 
natural way. 
So, for example, if 0 !=' uA then +A t A . 
Theorem 6 !=' is categorical. 
Proof: Given a semantics for a language, for any c1assification c let X, Y, and 
Z be the sets of sentences that are designated, undesignated, and neither des-
ignated nor undesignated, respectively. There are only three cases to consider. 
1) Suppose that c assigns a designated value to sentence x. Then c is a p-clas-
sification iff +X, UX, tY, uY, +Z, uz tt:' tx. 2) Suppose that c assigns an 
undesignated value to sentence y. Then c is a p-classification iff +X, UX, t Y, 
u Y, +Z, uz +y. 3) Suppose that c assigns no value to sentence z. Then c is 
a p-classification iff +X, ux, t Y, u Y, +Z, uz tt:' uz. 
Problems regarding the use of other forces to define categorical conse-
quence are left open. 
3 Recently, Peter Woodruff mentioned this notion of assertion to me. As far as I know, it has not 
been discussed in published work on Judgement logics. 
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